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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
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deed of trust on the apartment
complex and an assignment of
rents. No payment had been made
on the note since 1984. United
noticed a foreclosure on the property, but on March 4, 1985, Timbers filed a chapter 11 petition,
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which had the effect of automatically staying .the foreclosure. 2
The parties agreed to an order allowing Timbers to pay United the
net income produced by the
apartments.
On March 18, 1985, United
moved in the bankruptcy court for
relief from the automatic stay
under Section 362(d)(l) of the
Bankruptcy Code alleging that
Timbers failed to provide adequate protection of United's security interest. At an evidentiary
hearing, United. argued that in the •
absence,of the stay under Section
362 it would have been able to
foreclose, sell the property, and
reinvest the proceeds at market
rate. United argued that the deprivation of its ability to reinvest
the foreclosure proceeds without
compensation means that Timbers
had not provided United with
"adequate protection" of its interest in the present value of such
proceeds. The real estate experts
agreed that the property was
likely to appreciate to a modest
extent, but United was undersecured at the time of the hearing
in that the value of the property
was less than $4,366,389, the
amount due on the debt at that
time.
Despite the fact that the collateral was not depreciating during
the period of the automatic stay,
the bankruptcy court agreed with

2

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).

United that it was not adequately
protected. The bankruptcy court
held that United's right to "adequate protection" included the
right to receive "opportunity
costs," which were the funds it
would earn if it were allowed to
foreclose, sell the collateral, and
reinvest the proceeds. The bankruptcy court ordered Timbers· to
pay United monthly payments of
$50,456, which included $42,500
for "lost opportunity costs" based
on the estimated proceeds from
foreclosure of $4.25 million reinvested at a 12 percent interest
rate, to commence six months
after the filing of the bankruptcy
petition to reflect the normal foreclosure delays. These payments
had to be made as a condition to
the continuation of the automatic
stay against foreclosure.
The bankruptcy court was not
without authority for its decision.
The court relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re American
Mariner Industries, Inc., 3 which
held that an undersecured creditor
is entitled to periodic interest
payments during the pendency of
the bankruptcy case to compensate for lost opportunity costs.

3 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); see also,
e.g., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); In
re Briggs Transp. Co., 780 F.2d 1339 (8th
Cir. 1985). For a discussion of adequate
protection of property rights and the automatic stay, see B. Weintraub & A.
Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual para.
1.09[6) (rev. ed. 1986).
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Court of Appeals

"Does 'adequate protection' under § 362(d)(l) contemplate that
The district court affirmed the
an undersecured creditor will redecision of the bankruptcy court,
ceive postpetition interest pe4
but the court of appeals reversed.
riodically in cash or some other
The court of appeals recognized
form to compensate it for 'lost
that commentators and courts
opportunity' when its right to
often see the issue regarding the
foreclose is temporarily susright of an undersecured cr:,editor
pended by the automatic stay?"6
to lost opportunity costs as one of
The court of appeals examined
policy and economics. The court
several provisions of the Bankof appeals, however, rejected this
ruptcy Code (including the interapproach to the problem:
est provisions found in Sections
502
and 506) and their predecesOne side opines that the failure to
award postpetition interest Ifay- sors in the former Bankruptcy Act
ments will restrict the availability and concluded that unencumof secured credit to the detriment bered assets of the estate should
of businesses that cannot obtain not be used to benefit one class of
credit otherwise. The other con- creditors at the expense of ancentrates on the deleterious effects other class.
that postpetition interest payments
The importance of this issue is
will have on the possibility of reorganizations. It seems that the de- reflected in the fact that the court
bate has" become not what the of appeals agreed to a rehearing
Bankruptcy Code requires, but en bane, at which the court again
what it should require. If we were held in favor of Timbers,' and the
Members of Congress, or if bank- Supreme Court then granted
ruptcy law were not controlled by a United's petition for certiorari.
statute, we might find the economic
debate of primary significance.
However, as judges, we must be
governed by congressional intent
as set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code. 5

The court of appeals, holding
that United was not entitled to
payments for lost opportunity
costs as a condition of the continuation of the stay, saw the issue
as one of statutory construction:

Statutory Construction·
Reiterated
The Supreme Court, using the
same approach as the court of
appeals by focusing on statutory
construction rather than on policy
and economics, affirmed the court
of appeals decision and held that
an undersecured creditor is not
entitled to compensation for the
6Jd.

4

793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986).
s Id. at 1384.

7
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delay in foreclosure caused by the
automatic stay as an element of
"adequate protection."
The Court focused on Section
362(d)(l), which provides for relief from the automatic stay "for
cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest." [Emphasis added.] Section
361 gives content to the phrase
"adequate protection" by setting
forth three methods by which
adequate protection may be afforded: (1) cash or periodic cash
payments to the extent that the
stay results in a decrease in the
value of the party's interest in the
property, (2) providing an additional or replacement lien to the
extent that the stay results in. a
decrease in the value of the party's interest in the property, and
(3) granting such other relief as
will result in the "indubitable
equivalent" of the party's interest
in the property.
Clearly, the phrase "interest in
property" in Section 362(d)(l)
"includes the right of a secured
creditor to have· the security
applied in payment of the debt
upon completion of the reorganization; and that the interest is not
adequately protected if the security is depreciating during the
term of the stay." 8 However,
does the phrase ''interest in property" also include the secured
party's right to take immediate

possession of the collateral and
apply it in payment of the debt?
Although the Court agrees that
"viewed in the isolated context
of§ 362(d)(l)," 9 the phrase could
reasonably be given the meaning
that United asserts, the interpretation of that phrase must take
into consideration other sections
of the Code:
Statutory construction, however, is
a holistic endeavor. A provision
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme
-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear
. . . or because only one of the
permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law .10

Based on other sections of the
Code, the Supreme Court concluded that the "interest in property" protected under Section
362(d)(l) does not include a secured party's right to immediate
foreclosure.
Determination of Secured Status
The Court focused on Section
506(a) dealing with the amount of
a secured claim in bankruptcy.
'I)lat section provides that a creditor has a secured claim ''to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's inter9

8

108 S. Ct. at 629.

/d. at 630.

IO
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est in such property" and has an
unsecured claim as to the balance.
The creditor's interest in property
within the context of Section
506(a) means the value of the collateral and does not take into account the right to immediate possession upon default. "If the latter
were included, the 'value of such
creditor's interest' would increase, and the proportions of the
claim that are secured and unsecured would alter, as the stay
continues-since the value of the
entitlement to use the collateral
from the date of bankruptcy
would rise with the passage of
time." 11 The Court believes that
the phrase "value of such entity's
interest" in Sections 361(1) and
361(2), when applied to secured
creditors, has the same meaning.
A more important factor than
the terminology used in Section
506(a) was the language of Section
506(b), which has the effect of denying undersecured creditors postpetition interest on their claims.
Section 506(b) also denies oversecured creditors postpetition interest to the extent that the interest,
when added to the principal
amount of the claim, will exceed
the value of the collateral. Since
this provision allows payment of
postpetition interest only out of
the "security cushion," the undersecured creditor falls within
the general rule found in Section

II

Id.
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502(b)(2) that disallows postpetition interest.1 2
If the Code had meant to give the
undersecured creditor, who is thus
denied interest on his claim, interest on the value of his collateral,
surely this is where that disposition
would have been set forth, and not
obscured within the "adequate protection" provision of § 362(d)(l).
Instead of the intricate phraseology,
set forth above, § 506(b) would
simply have said that the secured
creditor is entitled to interest "on
his allowed claim, or on the value
of the property securing his allowed claim, whichever is lesser."13

The Court rejected United's argument that Section 506(b) is
merely an alternative method for
compensating oversecured creditors and that the section does not
mean that undersecured creditors
are not entitled to compensation.
"Section 506(b)'s denial of postpetition interest to undersecured
creditors merely codified preCode bankruptcy law, in which
that denial was part of a conscious allocation of reorganization
benefits and losses between undersecured and unsecured creditors." 14
The Court also found that
United's interpretation of Section
362(d)(l) was "structurally incon12 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), which provides for the allowance of a claim ''except
to the extent that . . . (2) such claim is for
unmatured interest."
13 108 S. Ct. at 631.
14 Id.
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sistent" with Section 552, which
provides that a prepetition security interest does not reach property acquired postpetition, except
for a perfected security interest in
postpetition proceeds, rents, and
profits. Under United's position,
the undersecured creditor who
does not have a perfected security
interest in after-acquired rents or
profits ''in effect achieves the
same result by demanding the
'use value' of his collateral under
§ 362." 15
United's interpretation of Section 362(d)(l) also "makes nonsense" of Section 362(d)(2),
which, as an independent ground
for relief from the stay, provides
that the court shall grant relief if
(1) the debtor does not have
equity in the property (i.e., the
creditor is undersecured) and (2)
the property is not necessary to an
effective reorganization.
By applying the "adequate protection of an interest in property"
provision of § 362(d)(l) to the alleged "interest" in the earning
power of collateral, petitioner
creates the strange consequence
that § 362 entitles the secured creditor to relief from the stay (1) if he is
undersecured (and thus not eligible
for interest under§ 506(b)), or (2) if
he is undersecured and his collateral "is not necessary to an effective reorganization." This renders
§ 362(d)(2) a practical nullity and a
theoretical absurdity.'' 16

Indubitable Equivalent
United also argued that denying
it compensation for the delay in
foreclosure was inconsistent with
Section 361(3), which provides
that adequate protection may be
given by granting relief "as will
result in the realization by such
entity of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in
such property." [Emphasis added.] United pointed to the same
phrase, "indubitable equivalent,"
found in Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii),
which provides standards for socalled cram-down confirmation
and connotes the right of a secured creditor to receive present
value of its collateral, including
the payment of interest if the
claim is to be paid over time.
United argued, in essence, that
since "indubitable equivalent" in
Section 1129 requires payment to
a secured creditor based on
present value, then "indubitable
equivalent" in Section 361(3) requires that "present value" of the
collateral be realized as an element of adequate protection for
automatic stay purposes.
Although the Court agreed that
under Section 1129(b) a secured
creditor is entitled to receive
under a plan the present value of
its collateral, the Court qisagreed
with United regarding the source
of the "present value" requirement:
This entitlement arises, however,
not from the phrase "indubitable

" Id. at 632.
16fd.
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equivalent" in § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ili),
but from the provision of§ 1129(b)
(2)(A)(i)(II) that guarantees the secured creditor 'deferred cash payments . . . of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of at least
the value of such [secured claimant's] interest in the estate's interest in such property." (Emphasis
added) ... In§ 361(3), by contrast,
the relief pending the stay need
only be such "as will result in the
realization . . . of the indubitable
equivalent" of the collateral. (Emphasis added). It is obvious (since
§§ 361 and 362(d)(1) do not entitle
the secured creditor to immediate
payment of the principal of his collateral) that this "realization" is to
"result" not at once, but only upon
completion of the reorganization. It
is then that he must be assured
"realization ... of the indubitable
equivalent" of his collateral.t'

[VOL. 21 : 266 1989]

in In re Murel Holding Corp., 19
where the phrase was first used,
also was dismissed by the Court
as jrrelevant because that phrase
was.. used in Murel to refer to the
jeopardized principal of the loan
rather than interest.
Conclusion

It is interesting to note that the
final paragraph of the Supreme
Court's opinion states that the
Fifth Circuit correctly held that
"the undersecured petitioner is
not entitled to interest on its collateral during the stay to assure adequate protection under
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1)." 20 Many
courts and commentators discuss
this issue in terms of "lost opportunity costs" or similar phrases.
Call it what you will, the right to
The Court also rejected United's receive postpetition .interest durposition that its interpretation of ing the pendency of the automatic
Sections 361 and 362(o)(l) is sup- stay is _the issue.
ported by legislative history that
The final comment of the Court
states that secured creditors was that United never sought re"should not be deprived of the lief from the stay under Secbenefit of their bargain/ ' 18 The tion 362(d)(2). Since United was
Court found such generalizations undersecured, the debtor had no
inadequate to overcome the plain equity in the collateral. Nonethemeaning of Sections 506 and less, it would appear from the
362(d)(l). United's reliance on the facts that the debtor would have
phrase "indubitable equivalent" been able to meet its burden to
prove that the apartment complex, which was the debtor's sole
asset, was necessary to an effec11 /d. at 633 (emphasis added).
1s H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
tive reorganization, assuming that
Sess. 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5839; S. Rep. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
6295.
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75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
108 S. Ct. at 635 (emphasis added).
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a successful reorganization was
likely. 21
There is an important lesson in
the Court's opinion that may be
2t The Court elaborated on the meaning
of the phrase "necessary to an effective
reorganization" in§ 362(d)(2). "What this
requires is not merely a showing that if
there is conceivably to be an effective reorganization, this property will be needed
for it; but that the property is essential for
an effective reorganization that is in prospect. This means ... that there must be 'a
reasonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a reasonable time.' "
108 S. Ct. at 632.

directed toward those who have
expressed the view that secured
creditors are entitled in bankruptcy to the same substantive
rights and benefits that they enjoy
out of bankruptcy. "The reorganized debtor is supposed to
stand on his own two feet. The
debtor in process of reorgttnization, by contrast, is· given ma!lJ
temporary protections against the
normal operation of the law. " 22
22

108 S. Ct. at 634.
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